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The social insurance system plays a very important role in the Swedish econ- 
omy. In 1994, benefits paid out by this system represented 20 percent of Swe- 
den's GDP, or about 32 percent of all public spending. Table 9.1 shows the size 
of the different parts of the social insurance system. From this table, it is appar- 
ent that the largest share of social insurance spending is directed toward indi- 
viduals who have permanently left the labor market, mostly older people. So- 
cial security  spending consists  of  three  main parts:  the basic  pension, the 
supplementary pension  (ATP), and the partial retirement pension. The pay- 
ments from these systems amounted to 42.4, 55.3, and  1.3 percent, respec- 
tively, of total pension payments in  1994. The supplementary pension and the 
basic pension can be paid as an old age pension, a survivor pension, or a dis- 
ability pension. People who have permanently left the labor market in Sweden 
are largely dependent on payments from social security. On average, about 74 
percent of the income of individuals older than age sixty-five consists of  pay- 
ments from the social security system.' 
Forecast financial problems in the system led to a major reform to be fully 
implemented by 2001. The majority in the Swedish parliament agreed on the 
principles of the new pension system in  1994, although all the details have yet 
to be determined. There are two causes for the forecast financial problems of 
the current system: demographic change and slow growth in the Swedish econ- 
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Table 9.1  Social Insurance Expenditures in Sweden, 1994 
Percentage Share 
Expenditures  of  Total Social  Percentage 
in SKr  Insurance  Share of 
Million  Expenditures  GDP 
Pension insurance 
National basic pension 
National basic old age pension 
National basic disability pension 
National supplementary pension 
Nation supplementary old age 




Sickness and parental insurance 











































omy. The ratio between the number of persons over age sixty-five to the num- 
ber aged sixteen to sixty-four rose from 0.184 in  1950 to 0.278 today. This 
ratio is projected to rise to 0.35 by  2050 and to 0.37 by  2070. There are two 
aspects of  changes in the demographic structure: the increase in  life expec- 
tancy and the aging of the baby-boom generation. The increase in life expec- 
tancy increases the financial pressure-for  the basic pension system, which 
is a pure pay-as-you-go scheme, and for the supplementary pension system, 
which is a mixture of  a funded and a pay-as-you-go scheme. The aging of 
the baby-boom generation creates extra financial pressure in the basic pension 
system. But, because the supplementary pension system is a partly funded sys- 
tem, this source of financial pressure could be alleviated if the fund is built up 
when this generation is active in the labor market. 
The continuing slow economic growth in Sweden causes problems primarily 
for the supplementary pension system. National Social Insurance Board stud- 
ies show that this scheme is not viable if the long-run rate of growth falls below 
about 2 percent (see National Social Insurance Board 1993). 
Another important component of  the pension system is the centrally bar- 
gained occupational pension schemes. As is well known, Sweden has a highly 
unionized labor market. Occupational pension schemes are determined in cen- 
tral agreements between the central unions and the employers’ confederations. 
Although the unionization rate is about 81 percent, the occupational pensions 
are compulsory for most workers and cover about 95 percent of the labor mar- 
ket. The influence of the centrally bargained pension plans is growing. 
An explicit goal of pension reform is to increase work incentives (especially 357  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
for older people). However, very little is known about what economic incen- 
tives to leave the labor market the current social insurance system provides and 
the extent to which the system affects the behavior of older workers since very 
few empirical studies have been conducted in this area.z  The aim of this paper 
is to provide an overview of the incentives erected by the social security system 
for older people to participate in the labor force. We  also consider the occupa- 
tional pension scheme for blue-collar workers. We  compare the estimates of 
these incentives with the observed pattern of labor force participation of older 
people historically and by age groups. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 9.1 describes the labor market 
behavior of older workers in Sweden, the present situation, and development 
over time. Section 9.2 provides an overview of the social security system and 
the occupational pension schemes. Section 9.3 presents the results from a sim- 
ulation model designed to reveal the economic incentives implied by the Swed- 
ish social security system and the occupational pension scheme for blue-collar 
workers (STP) for a representative individual. Section 9.4 concludes. 
9.1  The Labor Market Behavior of Older Persons in Sweden 
Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show the historical trends in labor force participation 
rates since 1963 for men and women  over age forty-four. Four different age 
groups are studied: forty-five to fifty-four, fifty-five to fifty-nine, sixty to sixty- 
four, and sixty-five to seventy-four. Considering the entire historical period, 
figure 9.1 shows that the labor force participation rate of older men decreased 
in all age groups. But, in the youngest age group, forty-five to fifty-four, the 
decrease is comparatively small. Labor force participation for the age group 
fifty-five to fifty-nine goes from about 95 to about 82 percent in  1995. There 
is a comparatively large decrease in labor force participation for the age group 
sixty to sixty-four: from 85 percent in 1963 to 55 percent in 1995, or 30 per- 
centage points. Figure 9.1 also shows that labor force participation in the three 
youngest age groups decreased more in the most recent recession in the Swed- 
ish economy (1991) than in the years preceding the recession. The largest de- 
crease is in the age group sixty to sixty-four for this period as well. The histori- 
cal trend in labor force participation of the age group sixty-five to seventy-four 
reveals that the change in mandatory retirement age, from age sixty-seven to 
age sixty-five in 1976,3  was preceded by a steady decrease in labor force partic- 
ipation of the age group affected by  the reform; that is, here, the actual effect 
of the reform was small. 
The trend in the labor force participation of  older women, shown in figure 
9.2, is very different from that of  men: for the entire period 1963-90,  labor 
2.  The economic literature on the labor supply of the elderly and its relation to social insurance 
3. Section 9.2 below provides a more detailed description of labor market institutions and man- 
spending is reviewed in app. B. 
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Fig. 9.1  Historical trends in the labor force participation of older men 
Source: Various reports of  the Swedish Labor Force Survey, provided by  Statistics Sweden, ad- 
justed to be comparable between different points of time. 
Nore: LF = labor force. 
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Fig. 9.2  Historical trends in the labor force participation of older women 
Source: See fig. 9.1 above. 
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Fig. 9.3  Share of Swedish men and women age fifty-five and over who receive 
disability pension and old age pension 
Source: Different issues of Allman Forsakring (National Insurance Board, Stockholm). 
Note: SS = social security; DI = disability insurance. 
force participation rates increased for all age groups between forty-five and 
sixty-four, although at a decreasing rate. The smallest increase is in the age 
group sixty to sixty-four, viewed over the entire period. Labor force participa- 
tion decreased  somewhat in all three  groups after the 1991 recession. The 
largest decrease for women, about 7 percentage points between 1991 and 1994, 
is in the age group sixty to sixty-four. 
Of course, the extent to which social security might have affected the ob- 
served pattern of labor force participation depends on the coverage and gener- 
osity of the schemes. Ever since the introduction of  the compulsory old age 
pension (fokpension)  in 1913, all Swedish citizens are entitled to an old age 
pension. Figure 9.3 shows the percentage share of men and women older than 
fifty-five years who actually receive an old age or disability pension for the 
period  1964-94.  It reveals that the share of  women in  this age group who 
receive an old age or disability pension is somewhat higher (about 4 percent- 
age points) than it is for men in this age group-throughout  the entire period. 
It is interesting to compare the big leap for the number of men who received 
an old age pension in 1976 with the smooth decrease in labor force participa- 
tion before 1976. The difference was caused by the change in mandatory retire- 
ment age, which was preceded by  agreements between the trade unions and 
the employers’ confederations on occupational pensions that offer benefits be- 
tween age sixty-five and age sixty-seven. 360  MIrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
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Fig. 9.4  Replacement rates of old age pension from the national pension system 
for a production worker with average wage 
Source: Palme (1990). 
But the most striking fact in figure 9.3 is the dramatic increase between 1964 
and 1994 in the share of men and women receiving old age or disability pen- 
sions: an increase of  about 25 percentage points for men  and about 28 for 
women. About 6 percentage points of this increase for men and women can be 
attributed to the increased number of  disability pensions; the number of old 
age pensions increased by  about 8 percentage points after the 1976 pension 
reform, when the mandatory retirement age was decreased from sixty-seven to 
sixty-five; a very small part of the increase can be attributed to a small increase 
in the early withdrawal of social security benefits. The rest, about 11 percent- 
age points for men and 14 percentage points for women, might be caused by 
changes in the demographic  structure, primarily, the increase in life expec- 
tancy. 
Figure 9.4 shows the replacement level from the national Swedish pension 
~ystem,~  that is, the amount of the first year’s pension as a share of the preced- 
ing year’s earnings provided that the worker continues to work until he or she 
reaches the age of  mandatory retirement.s The calculation is made using the 
4.  This includes the basic pension and the supplementary pension (ATP) schemes. Occupational 
pension schemes are not included. 
5. The source of the estimates of  the compensation levels shown in fig. 9.4 is Palme (1990), 
where the compensation levels in eighteen OECD countries are compared, and Kangas and Palme 
(1989), where the compensation levels in the Nordic countries are compared. 361  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
earnings history of an average production worker (APW).6  The compensation 
levels are calculated for net income; that is, income taxes are considered in the 
calculations. Figure 9.4 shows the compensation level for four hypothetical 
single workers: (1) one who has an earnings history  amounting to half  the 
earnings of the APW in each year; (2) one who has always earned the same as 
the APW; (3) one who has earned double the APW; and (4) one who has always 
earned three times as much as the APW. 
Figure 9.4 also shows the compensation level for a married couple, where 
the husband is assumed to have had the same earnings as the APW. Here, it is 
assumed that the wife never worked.'  The worker is assumed to retire at age 
sixty-five. The replacement rate is generally different if the individual elects to 
retire earlier than the mandatory retirement age-as  sections 9.2 and 9.3 below 
show. Figure 9.4 shows that the replacement level increased a great deal in the 
years between  1960 and  1980. The maturing of  the supplementary pension 
system explains the largest part of the increase. 
9.1.1  Labor Market Behavior in 1995 
To get a more detailed picture of the current pattern of exiting from the labor 
force, the  1994 and  1995 Labor Force Surveys are used.8 Figure 9.5 shows 
labor force participation by  age and sex for individuals older than forty-five 
years. To improve the precision in  the estimates, the  1994 and  1995 Labor 
Force  Surveys are combined. Figure 9.5  shows two properties of  the labor 
force participation of older workers. First, labor force participation decreases 
with age, except for women in their late forties and for some age groups be- 
tween sixty-five and sixty-nine for men and women.9 It could also be seen that 
the decrease in labor force participation is fairly moderate until workers reach 
age fifty-seven. Labor force participation for, for example, fifty-six-year-olds 
is above 80 percent for men and women. Among individuals in their late fifties 
and early sixties, labor force participation rates fall every year and at an in- 
creasing rate. Labor force participation for individuals age sixty-four, one year 
before the mandatory retirement age, is about 30 percent for women and 43 
percent for men. Second, labor force participation rates are higher for men in 
all age groups. But the difference is very small for people in their late forties, 
increasing gradually with age. At age sixty-four, the difference is as large as 
about 13 percentage points. 
Figure 9.6 distinguishes among the employed, unemployed, disabled,'O and 
6.  The average producrion worker is a concept frequently used for comparing wages in different 
countries (see, e.g., US.  Department of Labor 1996).  The Swedish APW is used for the calcula- 
tions in fig. 9.4 
7. But note that this situation is very uncommon in Sweden. 
8. Appendix A describes these surveys. 
9.  The latter finding should be interpreted with care since, in the Labor Force Survey, the sample 
sizes for individuals older than age sixty-five are very small (for details, see app. A). 
10. Because the Labor Force Survey does not distinguish between the individuals who receive 
an old age pension and those who receive a disability pension, we used the number of individuals 
who receive a disability pension provided by the National Social Insurance Board to obtain figures 
on the share of the disabled in each age group. +  Male LFP  1  Female LFP  1 
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Fig. 9.5  Labor force participation (LFP) rates by age and sex 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Swedish Labor Force Survey, 1994 
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Fig. 9.6  Distribution of activities of older men by age 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Swedish Labor Force Survey, 1994 and 1995 (provided 
by  Statistics Sweden), combined. For the graph of the share of individuals receiving a disability 
pensions, we have used statistics from the entire Swedish population published in Allman Forsuk- 
ring I995  (National Social Insurance Board, Stockholm). 363  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
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Fig. 9.7  Distribution of activities of older women by age 
Source: See fig. 9.6 above. 
retired, by  age, for older men. Figure 9.7 provides the same information for 
women. Figures 9.6 and 9.7 show that the graphs for the unemployed and for 
the disabled continue only to age sixty-four. This is because the Labor Force 
Survey counts only people younger than the mandatory retirement age, sixty- 
five, as unemployed. People older than age sixty-five are not entitled to unem- 
ployment insurance. Our definition of disabled is an individual who receives a 
disability benefit from the national pension system, which is only possible for 
those under sixty-five years of age." 
By comparing the graphs for the retired and the disabled, figures 9.6 and 9.7 
show that in all age groups between forty-five and sixty-four, the most common 
way  to leave the labor market for men and women is to become a disability 
pensioner. At age sixty-four, as many as about 37 percent of  all men and 35 
percent of all women receive a full-time disability pension. A comparison of 
figures 9.6 and 9.7 shows that women, on average, retire somewhat earlier than 
men: at age sixty-four, about 20 percent of men and 25 percent of  women are 
retired. A study of the graphs for the unemployed shows that unemployment is 
about equal in all age groups. A comparison of figure 9.6 with figure 9.7 shows 
that the unemployment rate is somewhat higher for men than for women for 
the entire age range considered in the figures. 
11. Section 9.2 below describes the rules for selecting delayed payments  from the basic and 
supplementary pension schemes (including possible economic gains from the selection). 364  MHrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
Age 
Fig. 9.8  Share of older men who receive different kinds of support from the 
public sector by age 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from 1994 Household Income Survey, provided by 
Statistics Sweden. 
9.1.2  Income Sources of Older Persons 
Figures 9.8 and 9.9 reveal the incidence of private, occupational, and public 
pensions among older persons in 1994. The data source for these calculations 
is the Household Income Survey (HINK) provided by Statistics Sweden.'* 
Figure 9.8 shows the share of  all men between the ages of  forty-five and 
seventy-five, divided into one-year age groups, who receive an old age pension, 
a disability pension, or any other form of public assistance. The graphs for a 
disability pension confirm what is already known from figure 9.6 above, al- 
though another data source is used for these figures: about 35 percent of the 
sixty-four-year-olds receive a disability pension, and the rate of  receipt in- 
creases rapidly starting from about age fifty-seven. 
When comparing the share of retired men in figure 9.6 with the estimates of 
the share of men receiving an old age pension shown in figure 9.8, two things 
should be noted: First, for men aged sixty to sixty-four, the rate of take-up of 
old age pensions is about 10 percentage points lower than the rate of retired 
men in this age group. So about half the men who retire before the mandatory 
retirement age of sixty-five do not claim an old age pension from social secu- 
rity until age sixty-five. Second, according to the data in figure 9.8, almost all 
people claim old age pension benefits at age sixty-five, although, as shown in 
figure 9.6, only about 85 percent are retired at that age. The rate of all other 
public transfers is very high for men in the younger age groups considered in 
12. For a detailed description of  this survey, see app. A. 365  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
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Fig. 9.9 
private pensions by age 
Source: See fig. 9.8 above. 
Share of all Swedish men and women who receive occupational and 
figure 9.8: about 70 percent for men age f~rty-five.'~  This graph decreases 
steadily in older age groups. 
Figure 9.9 shows the proportion of men and women between the ages of 
forty-five and seventy-five, again divided into one-year age groups, who re- 
ceive occupational and private pensions. As expected, the proportion receiving 
private and occupational pensions increases rapidly at age sixty-five. But figure 
9.9 also shows that the proportion decreases steadily after age sixty-five. This 
is due to the increase in the coverage of both occupational and private pensions 
in  younger birth cohorts. The increased gender gap that is most evident for 
occupational pensions in older age groups is also due to changes in the work 
patterns of younger birth cohorts, that is, the increased rate of labor force par- 
ticipation of women. 
Figure 9.10 displays the average shares of  different  sources of household 
income by the age of the head of the family. Although, as explained in appen- 
dix A, these figures should be interpreted with caution because the sample 
sizes for some components of household income are very small, it is interesting 
13. Note that this figure includes all public transfers, e.g., payments from the compulsory sick- 
ness insurance and income support programs directed primarily toward households with dependent 
children, like housing allowances. 366  Mirten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
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Fig. 9.10  Average shares of different sources of family income by age of 
family head 
Source: See fig. 9.8 above. 
to note that the observations made in figure 9.9 above are confirmed. The im- 
portance of private and occupational pensions is decreasing among older pen- 
sioners. The share consisting of earnings is decreasing from about 75 percent 
at age fifty to about 65 percent at age fifty-eight. After that age, the share of 
earnings is decreasing at an increasing rate. The share of capital income is 
around  10 percent  in  the younger  and  around  15 percent  in  the  older  age 
groups considered. 
9.2  Key Features of the Social Security System 
9.2.1  A History of the Social Security System in Sweden 
In 1913, the first compulsory old age pension insurance was implemented. 
It was a fully funded system consisting of two parts: a means-tested basic pen- 
sion and a supplementary pension, which was related to individual contribu- 
tions. Although the compensation  levels from the  means-tested  part  of  this 
pension scheme were very low-only  11.3 percent of the earnings of an indus- 
trial worker (Elm& 1960)-the  1913  reform was fundamentally important: all 
Swedish citizens were covered by an old age pension scheme. This Swedish 
system was the first pension system in the world to cover all citizens regardless 
of occupation. 367  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
In  1935 and 1946, two major reforms were implemented. Criticism  from 
conservatives and liberals about large, state-controlled pension  funds, which 
influenced capital markets, dominated the political debate preceding the 1935 
reform. The Social Democrats  wanted to  increase benefit  levels without  in- 
creasing expenditures for the pension system. This debate led to a switch to a 
pay-as-you-go system in the  1935 reform. The financing of  the system was 
changed to employers’ contributions, and the levels of pensions were substan- 
tially increased. 
In 1941, the minimum pension was about 29.4 percent of the earnings of an 
industrial worker (Elmb 1960). Because of means testing, the increase in the 
replacement  rates also implied that the share of  the population that actually 
received  pension  payments increased from about 70 to 90 percent  after the 
reform. In the  1946 reform, the basic pension replaced the old means-tested 
pension. A housing supplement in the areas where the cost of living was the 
greatest was also introduced. 
The supplementary pension (ATP) was implemented  after a 1959 referen- 
dum. The two main alternatives in the referendum were a compulsory system 
(which was finally implemented), proposed by the blue-collar trade union and 
the Social Democratic Party, and a voluntary system, proposed by the employ- 
ers’ confederation and the conservative and liberal parties. The first birth co- 
hort affected by  the supplementary pension was that born in  1896. The first 
year when pension  right income for a supplementary pension  was recorded 
was 1960. 
In  1976, the mandatory retirement age was decreased from sixty-seven to 
sixty-five,  and the right  to a partial retirement  pension  was  introduced.  In 
1990, a gender-neutral survivor pension replaced the widow’s pension. 
In 1994, a majority in the Swedish parliament reached an agreement on prin- 
ciples for a new old age pension. Details of the new system will be determined 
in 1998. The first cohort to be affected by the new system is that born in 1938. 
Twenty percent of  the pension coverage provided to this group will be deter- 
mined under the rules of the new system and 80 percent under the rules of the 
old. The new system determines  5 percent more of the pension  coverage of 
each successive cohort. Hence, 25 percent of the coverage provided to the co- 
hort born  in 1939 will be determined under the new  system and 75 percent 
under the old. The coverage provided to the cohort born in 1954 will be deter- 
mined entirely under the new system. No pensions will be paid out under the 
new system until 2001. 
9.2.2 
Employer contributions levied on wages finance the social security system. 
In  1994, the  level  of  all  social  contributions  was  31.36 percentage  points 
on gross earnings. The level of the contribution for the national basic pension 
was 5.86, for the supplementary pension  (ATP)  13.00, and for the part-time 
pension 0.20 percentage points. In the current system, there is no ceiling on 
Current Features of the Social Security System 368  MHrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
contributions. General tax revenues partially finance the national basic pen- 
sion. 
All Swedish citizens and all persons living in Sweden are entitled to a basic 
pension.  In principle,  all receive the  same amount irrespective  of  previous 
earnings. There is a reduction of the amount if the time of residence in Sweden 
is under forty years and the number of years with income in Sweden is under 
thirty years. 
Like all social insurance, the basic pension is related to the basic amount 
(BA). The BA is linked to the CPI. As the BA is decided each year by  the 
government, it is possible for a majority in the Swedish parliament to make 
discretionary changes that do not follow the development of the CPI. This has 
happened on several occasions since 1960. During the period between Novem- 
ber 1980 and November 1982, the BA was temporary linked to another price 
index, which to a lesser extent than the CPI reflected large increases in oil and 
electric prices during that period. In addition, the price increases that resulted 
from the large devaluation of  the Swedish currency in  1982 were not fully 
reflected in the  BA. And,  during  the  1990s, pensions have  not been  fully 
aligned with price indexing owing to several measures meant to cut the govern- 
ment budget deficit. In 1995, the BA was SKr 34,986 (U.S.$4,907), and the an- 
nual wage of an average production worker was SKr 189,488 (U.S.$26,576).I4 
The basic pension for a single old age pensioner is 96 percent of the BA. 
The basic pension is reduced to 78.5 percent if the person is married. Before 
1995, it was reduced only if  the person  was married to someone who also 
received the basic pension. Individuals with no, or low, ATP are entitled to a 
special supplement. The special supplement is independent of  marital status 
and is 55.5 percent of the BA. The special supplement is reduced on a one-to- 
one basis against the supplementary pension. Thus, a single old age pensioner 
with only a basic pension and a special supplement receives 151.5 percent of 
the BA. In 1995, that was SKr 53,004 (U.S.$7,434) in annual pension, or 28.0 
percent of the annual earnings of an average production worker. In 1994, about 
20 percent of all old age pensioners did not have a supplementary pension; that 
is, they received only a basic pension and a special supplement. This group 
mainly consists of older women; for example, 63 percent of  female old age 
pensioners older than age eighty-five did not receive a supplementary pension. 
The corresponding figures for male and female old age pensioners between the 
ages of sixty-five and sixty-nine were 1.7 and 13.8  percent, respectively. 
As previously mentioned, the survivor pension was changed in  1990, and 
women born before and after 1945 follow different rules for the survivor pen- 
sion. For women born before  1945, the rules for the widow’s pension  still 
apply. They get 90 percent of the BA until they reach age sixty-five. The rules 
14. To  convert Swedish krona to U.S.  dollars, we have used the exchange rate of  SKr 7.13 = 
U.S.$l.OO,  which was the average selling price of Swedish krona in  1995. This exchange rate is 
used throughout this paper. 369  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
for the new gender-neutral transitional survivor benefit apply to those born 
after 1 January 1945. According to these rules, the survivor benefit is paid to 
the insured individual's spouse within twelve months of the death. From 1 Jan- 
uary  1997, the period is reduced to six months. It could be prolonged under 
special circumstances (widows with dependent children). This means that, for 
most women born before 1945, a survivor benefit is a possible source of sup- 
plementary income for about the next ten to fifteen years. 
The supplementary pension (ATP) is related to the individual's earnings his- 
tory. The benefit level is determined in three steps. The first step is to determine 
the pension-rights income for each year from age sixteen. The calculation of 
pension-rights income is based on income from labor recorded in the annual 
tax return. Pension-rights income is the share of income exceeding the BA, 
and it is set to zero if the annual income from labor does not exceed the BA.I5 
Besides earnings and income from self-employment, transfer payments from 
social insurance, such as income from sickness and unemployment insurance, 
the parental cash benefit, and the partial retirement pension, are included in 
pension-rights income. Three years of pension-rights income greater than zero 
between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five are required to receive an old age 
pension under the ATP scheme. Income above 7.5 times the BA, the social 
security ceiling, is not included in pension-rights income.  l6 
The second step is to calculate the average pension points. This is done by 
dividing the pension-rights income by the corresponding year's  BA to obtain 
the pension points for each year. Thus, with the social security ceiling at 7.5 
times the BA, the maximum number of pension points an individual could get 
in a particular year is 6.5. The average pension point becomes the average from 
the individual's best fifteen years of pension points. 
The final step is to calculate the individual's ATP pension income (q)  by 
applying the formula 
I: = 0.6.  AP,  . min -,  1  . BA,  (:  1 
where AP, is individual average pension points, BA is the basic amount, and 
N,  is the number of years the individual has recorded a pension-rights income 
greater than zero. The number of years with pension points required for a full 
ATP pension is thirty for individuals born in 1924 or later. Using the amount 
of the BA in 1995 in the ATP formula gives us a maximum pension amount 
from  the  Swedish national  pension  system  in  1995 of  SKr  170,032 (U.S. 
$23,847), which is about 90 percent of the annual wage of an average produc- 
tion worker. 
15. Since 1993, two different basic amounts have been in use. The BA, which is linked to the 
CPI, is used to calculate pension-rights income (SKr 35,700 in 1995), and a reduced (by 2 percent) 
BA is used to calculate pension benefits. 
16. But the proportional payroll tax that finances the ATP pension is also paid on the share of 
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There is no dependents’ benefit within the ATP scheme; that is, the amount 
of the pension is independent of marital status, and there are no rules for split- 
ting future ATP benefits in a divorce. As previously mentioned, the survivor 
benefit in the ATP scheme has recently changed. Those who were born before 
1945  receive 35 or 40 percent of the deceased husband’s ATP pension until they 
reach the normal retirement age of sixty-five: 35 percent if there are children in 
the household who are eligible for a children’s pension and 40 percent other- 
wise. After the widow reaches age sixty-five, her ATP pension is reduced, tak- 
ing into account her own ATP pension. The rules are somewhat different for 
different birth  cohorts. The survivor pension  for those born  after  1 January 
1945 is gender neutral. The surviving spouse of an individual who has qualified 
for an ATP pension is entitled to the ATP survivor benefit within twelve months 
of the death according  to the rules implemented  in  1990. The amount is 20 
percent of the deceased spouse’s ATP pension-if  there are also surviving chil- 
dren entitled to the children’s pension-and  40 percent otherwise. 
The principal rules of the new pension system, which will replace the basic 
and ATP pension  schemes, were decided in  1994. The main changes are the 
following: Earnings from the entire life cycle are counted when the individual’s 
pension income is determined, rather than only the fifteen best years. The pen- 
sion is related to the real growth rate in the entire economy-rather  than price 
indexed. Changes in  life expectancy  also affect individual pension  income; 
that is, increased  life expectancy  and lower economic growth rates decrease 
individual pension income at a given retirement age. 
9.2.3  Social Security and Pathways to Early Exit from the Labor Market 
Sweden has a normal retirement age of sixty-five years.  Older workers are 
not covered by the employment security law;18  that is, workers older than age 
sixty-five are excepted from the seniority rules, and, if a firm wants to scale 
down, these workers are the least protected. Furthermore, workers older than 
age sixty-five are not entitled to support from unemployment  insurance. On 
the other hand, the wage cost for employers is lower for workers older than age 
sixty-five because the employers do not pay part of the payroll tax for the na- 
tional or occupational pensions. 
Central and municipal government employees automatically lose their jobs 
at age sixty-five. But exceptions to this rule are permitted for one year. In the 
private sector, there are often collective agreements between the trade unions 
and the employers’ confederations, prescribing  strict rules for mandatory re- 
tirement at age sixty-five. As the number of these agreements is very large, it 
is hard to get an overview of how strict the rules for mandatory retirement are. 
17. Wadensjo (1989) examines this issue in  detail. 
18. If the employee is not covered by a central agreement between the union and the employers’ 
confederation-and  only  about 5  percent of  the Swedish labor market  is-workers  up to age 
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There may also be a social convention to stop working at age sixty-five, at least 
in areas with high unemployment. 
The basic pension and the ATP can be claimed as early as age sixty and as 
late as age seventy. If the individual chooses to claim early, the amount of the 
benefit is permanently reduced by 0.5 percent for each month of early with- 
drawal. For example, if the individual retires at age sixty, the permanent reduc- 
tion is 30 percent (5 X  12 X 0.5). If the individual decides to begin to receive 
a pension later than at age sixty-five, the pension income is permanently  in- 
creased by 0.7 percent for each month of  postponement. 
Beside the national old age pension scheme, there are two other pathways 
to early retirement: the partial retirement pension and the disability pension. 
A  partial retirement pension allows workers age sixty and older to reduce 
their hours of  work and receive  a benefit  to replace the lost earnings. To be 
eligible  for  part-time  retirement,  the  worker  must  have  had  ten  years  of 
pension-rights earnings after age forty-five and must work at least twenty-two 
hours before the reduction. The benefit is 65 percent of the difference in earn- 
ings between before and after part-time retirement. 
The most common means of  leaving the labor market before age sixty-five 
is through a disability pension. Figure 9.6 above for men and figure 9.7 above 
for women illustrate this. In 1994,37 percent of men and 35 percent of women 
in the age group sixty-four years received a full-time disability pension. 
The disability pension consists of the basic pension and the income-related 
ATP supplement. Pension income is determined in the same way  an old age 
pension benefit is, without the actuarial reduction for withdrawal in advance. 
A disability pension can be received from age sixteen. To be entitled to one, 
an individual must have a physician’s certification that his or her capacity to 
work is permanently reduced by at least 25 percent owing to sickness or some 
similar cause. If  the capacity  to work  is reduced for a long period  but  not 
permanently, the individual is entitled to a temporary disability pension. If the 
individual’s working capacity is reduced by at least 25 percent but not by 50 
percent, he or she is eligible to receive 25 percent of the full disability pension 
benefit. If it is reduced by at least 50  but not by 75 percent or by at least 75 but 
not by  100 percent, he or she is eligible to receive 50 and 75 percent, respec- 
tively, of the full pension benefit. To obtain a full disability pension, an individ- 
ual must be completely unable to work. 
In practice, the strictness of medical screening has varied over time. Succes- 
sive, significant tightening of the eligibility rules was legislated in July  1993, 
October 1995, and January  1997. Figure 9.1 119 shows the number of new dis- 
ability pensions granted between 1971 and 1995. Studies of the long-term vari- 
ation in the number of new disability pensions granted between the mid-1970s 
19. New part-time disability pensions have been recalculated as the equivalent number of full- 
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and 1992 (see, e.g., Hedstrom 1987; or Wadensjo 1985) suggest that it can be 
explained by  variation in access to such pensions and increased compensation. 
Between  1970 and  1991, it was  possible to receive a disability pension for 
labor market reasons. In  order to be eligible to receive such a pension, the 
insured individual had to be over sixty years old and to have exhausted his or 
her right to unemployment insurance.2O During 1992 and 1993, the number of 
new disability pensions granted was very high. This was because, during these 
years, the social security administration tried to decrease the number of  on- 
going long periods with sickness benefits. In some cases, the individual was 
granted a disability pension because of these measures. 
9.2.4  Occupational Pensions 
There are basically  four different centrally bargained  pension plans for 
Swedish workers: (a)  two separate pension plans for employees in the private 
sector, one for white-collar  workers (ITP) and  one for blue-collar workers 
(STP), and (6)  two separate plans for public-sector employees, one for those 
employed by the central government and one for those employed by municipal- 
ities and counties. 
In  1985, ITP covered about 32.6 percent of  all insured workers, STP 39.8 
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percent, the pension for those employed in central government  10.7 percent, 
and the pension for those employed in municipalities 16.9 percent (Kangas and 
Palme 1989). Like social insurance, all the occupational pension schemes are 
price indexed. Pension rights are portable among these four main occupational 
pension schemes. 
STP 
The STP pension scheme was introduced after a central agreement between 
LO (the blue-collar workers’ union) and SAF (the employers’ confederation in 
the private sector) in 1971. It is entirely a pay-as-you-go pension plan, and it is 
financed through employers’ contributions. In 1996, the rate of the employers’ 
contribution was 3.15 percent of gross earnings. STP was radically reformed 
in 1996: for workers born after 1931, a new, partially funded pension was es- 
tablished. The main reason for the reform of  STP was the long-term decrease 
in the number of blue-collar workers in the private sector. 
The size of the individual STP pension depends on the number of years the 
worker has contributed to the scheme and annual earnings between the ages of 
fifty-five and fifty-nine. Receipt of a full STP pension requires that the insured 
worker have contributed for at least thirty years between the ages of twenty- 
eight and sixty-five and for at least three years between the ages of fifty-five 
and sixty-five. Provided that the insured worker has contributed for the maxi- 
mum number of years, the STP pension is 10 percent of the average earnings 
below 7.5 times the BA of the three best years between age fifty-five and age 
fifty-nine. The STP pension cannot be collected before the month of the indi- 
vidual’s sixty-fifth birthday, nor can payments be postponed. But pension pay- 
ments are not reduced if the worker decides to continue to work after age sixty- 
five. To summarize, the worker’s pension wealth is not reduced  at all, or by 
only a comparatively small amount, if he or  she decides to quit at age fifty- 
eight or later, but he or she will not receive a pension at all if he or she quits 
before age fifty-seven. 
ITP 
The ITP pension plan existed before the introduction of ATP in  1960. But 
then it covered only about 50 percent of the white-collar workers in the private 
sector. Since that  time, it has been  gradually  expanded  to cover almost  all 
private-sector white-collar workers. It is financed through an employer contri- 
bution, which, in 1996, was 1.15 on gross earnings for employees and contribu- 
tions made between the ages of twenty-eight and sixty-two for the insured indi- 
vidual. 
The size of the individual ITP pension depends on the number of years be- 
tween the ages of twenty-eight and sixty-five that the individual has contrib- 
uted to the ITP pension and on the salary the year before he or she starts to 
collect the pension. In general, receipt of  a full ITP pension requires thirty 
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vided  that the individual has contributed  the required  number  of  years,  the 
pension is 10 percent of last year’s salary up to 7.5 times the BA, 65 percent 
of the salary between 7.5 and 20 times the BA, and 32.5 percent between 20 
and 30 times the BA. The pension-rights age for the ITP pension is sixty-five. 
But the pension can be claimed from age sixty-two with a lifetime reduction 
of  0.6 percent for each month it is collected early. It can also be postponed 
until age seventy, with a lifetime increase of 0.6 percent for each month the 
pension is postponed. The ITP pension can also be claimed before age sixty- 
two; the amount of the pension is then determined individually depending on 
the sum of the individual’s contributions to the pension scheme. Because the 
individual contributes  to the scheme only until age sixty-two, the reduction 
is generally  larger if  he or she decides  to quit before rather  than after age 
sixty-two. 
State Employees’ Pensions 
The supplementary occupational scheme for employees in the central gov- 
ernment consists of two parts: one basic pension and one supplementary pen- 
sion. The basic pension is entirely a pay-as-you-go scheme, and pensions are 
paid directly from the central government budget. But the supplementary pen- 
sion is a fully funded system, and 1.7 percent of the annual salary is redirected 
to a pension fund. The size of the basic pension is determined in a way very 
similar to that in which  the ITP pension  is. Thirty years of work in central 
government are required for receipt of a full pension, and the same rules as for 
the ITP pension are applied if the individual does not fulfill this requirement. 
Apart from this requirement, the average of the five years preceding the year 
the individual decides to collect pension payments determines the size of  the 
pension, which is 10 percent of this five-year average up to 7.5 times the BA, 
65 percent between 7.5 and 20 times the BA, and 32.5 percent between 20 and 
30 times the BA. 
The retirement age is sixty-five for most people employed in central govern- 
ment. But there are several exceptions-most  important are military person- 
nel, who are in general pensioned at age fifty-five and receive a full occupa- 
tional pension from that date. A pension can be claimed voluntarily before the 
pension-rights age. The amount of the pension is then decreased by 0.4 percent 
for each month the pension is collected early for the rest of the individual’s life 
and by 2.4 percent on the share of the income below 7.5 times the BA when 
the individual turns age sixty-five. Pension payments can also be postponed. 
This increases the pension by 0.4 percent for the rest of the person’s life for 
each month the pension is postponed after the pension-rights age. 
Local Government Employees’ Pensions 
The pension plan for employees in the municipalities is administered by an 
insurance company owned by  Sweden’s 288 municipalities. Receipt of a full 
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between the ages of  eighteen and sixty-five; otherwise, the pension is reduced 
proportionally. The size of the pension is determined by the average of the five 
best years of the seven years preceding the year before the year the individual 
decides to retire. This pension scheme is fully coordinated with the basic and 
the  ATP  pensions  from  the  national  scheme.  Including  the  two  national 
schemes, the pension  is 96 percent  of the average calculated  salary (as pre- 
viously described) below the BA, 78.5 percent between the BA and 2.5 times 
the BA, 60 percent between 2.5 and 3.5 times the BA, 65 percent between 7.5 
and 20 times the BA, and 32.5 percent between 20 and 30 times the BA. 
The pension-rights age is sixty-five for most people employed by municipal 
governments. But pension payments can be collected from age sixty and post- 
poned until sixty-seven. If the individual decides to retire before age sixty-five, 
the pension is reduced for the rest of the individual’s life by  0.3 percent per 
month between age sixty-three and age sixty-five, by 0.4 percent between age 
sixty-two and age sixty-three, and by 0.5 percent per month between age sixty 
and age sixty-two. The pension is increased by 0.1 percent for each month the 
individual decides to continue working after age sixty-five. 
9.2.5  Income Taxes and Housing Allowances 
Besides the social security system, retirement incentives are also affected by 
income taxes.21  Sweden has an integrated income tax system. Individuals pay 
local and national income tax. The national government determines the tax 
base for national and local taxes. The tax base is divided into earned and capi- 
tal income. All income from the social insurance system is included in earned 
income-together  with wages and salaries. Income from capital is subject to 
a national proportional tax of 30 percent. Earned income is subject to national 
and local taxes. The tax rate for the local tax is determined independently by 
each of Sweden’s 288 municipalities. But there is a clustering of these tax rates 
at around 3 1 percent. 
Local income taxes are proportional, while the national income tax is pro- 
gressive. After the major income tax reform in  1991, the national income tax 
was set to zero below a certain breakpoint (about U.S.$25,000 in 1996) and to 
20 percent on all income above that level. In 1995, this tax was temporarily 
increased to 25 percent. This may give the false impression that there are only 
two possible marginal tax rates on earned income. But there is a basic deduc- 
tion that varies among different brackets of earned income. There are special 
rules for the basic deduction for old age pensioners that largely determine their 
marginal tax rates. 
For a single pensioner  with only a basic  pension, the basic deduction  is 
equal to the amount of  his pension income; that is, he pays no income tax at 
all. If the pension  income is higher than the amount of  a basic pension  (in 
1995, SKr 53,000, or U.S.$7,434), the deduction is reduced by 65 percent of 
21. For a more detailed description of the Swedish tax system, see Aronsson and Walker (1997). 376  MQrten  Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
the amount in excess of  SKr 53,000. But earnings, self-employment income, 
and private  pension  insurance  income do not  reduce the  deduction.  High- 
income pensioners are covered by the rules of basic deduction for nonpension- 
ers. The basic deduction for nonpensioners has a humped-shaped relation to 
income: For income below SKr 66,800 (U.S.$9,369) it was SKr 8,900 in 1995; 
it increased linearly with taxable income to SKr 18,100 at SKr 103,200; then 
it  decreased  linearly  for  taxable  incomes  between  SKr  108,700  and  SKr 
199,700 to once again, SKr 8,900  for higher taxable incomes. At income levels 
where the deduction for nonpensioners is not applicable, the deduction for a 
married pensioner is SKr 10,100 lower-compared  to a single pensioner at a 
given income level. A pensioner has a right to the deduction for nonpensioners 
if it is higher. 
Low-income old age, disability, and survivor pensioners  are entitled to a 
housing allowance. In 1995, this allowance was at most 85 percent of the hous- 
ing cost up to a certain ceiling and above a certain floor. It was reduced by 40 
percent (45 percent at high income levels) of income in excess of a basic pen- 
sion and special supplement and by  2 percent of wealth. In  1994, about 30 
percent of all old age pensioners received housing allowances, and the average 
amount was about SKr 17,673 (U.S.$2,479), that is, 33 percent of the amount 
of the lowest pension from the national pension system. 
9.2.6  Retirement Behavior 
Figures 9.12 and 9.13 depict the hazard rate out of the labor force for men 
and women, respectively. These figures are obtained by comparing the size of 
each one-year age group in the  1994 and  1995 Labor Force Surveys.22  The 
small negative estimates that are obtained for some of the age groups can thus 
be explained by sample error. The sample size does not permit us to present 
calculations  for the  age groups beyond  age  sixty-five. But  a  clear  pattern 
emerges in figures 9.12 and 9.13: the hazard rate out of  the labor force in- 
creases slowly until age sixty, when there is a marked increase in the rate of 
exiting from the labor force, that is, for the ages between sixty and sixty-four. 
At age sixty-five, the mandatory retirement age, there is a spike that indicates 
that almost 70 percent of  the remaining  labor force, both men  and women, 
decide to exit at this age. 
9.3  Retirement Incentives 
9.3.1  Simulation Modeling of Retirement Incentives 
This part of the paper provides an overview of the economic incentives for 
labor force participation generated by the Swedish social security and occupa- 
tional pension systems for blue-collar workers in the private sector. In order to 
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Fig. 9.12  Hazard rate out of the labor force for men by age 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Swedish Labor Force Survey, 1994 and 1995, provided 
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Fig. 9.13  Hazard rate out of the labor force for women by age 
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provide this overview, we simulate the social security outcome for a representa- 
tive individual. First, we  assume that the representative individual  is a man 
born on 1 January 1930. As a base case, we assume that his life-cycle earnings 
path will follow the earnings of the median income earner in each age among 
men born in 1930. We also examine the case where the representative individ- 
ual earning path for each year corresponds  to the earnings of the tenth and 
ninetieth percentiles of this birth cohort. To obtain the synthetic earning history 
of  our representative individual, we use administrative records of  the National 
Social Insurance Board. The sample we use includes all individuals born on 
the fifth, fifteenth, or twenty-fifth  of each month, that is, about 10 percent of 
the Swedish population. We selected men born in  1930 for the estimation of 
the tenth, fiftieth, and ninetieth percentile incomes. This sample contains about 
forty-two  hundred  people.  Between  1978 and  1994-except  for  the  year 
1983-we  have data that are obtained from tax records, which include income 
shares below the floor and above the ceiling for pension-rights income. For the 
entire period 1960-94,  we have data on the individual's pension points, which 
are registered at the National Social Insurance Board. 
Figure 9.14 shows the earnings histories that we obtained from the data for 
the median earner and the tenth and ninetieth percentiles, respectively. These 
figures show the results from the tax records and the pension point records. 
The potential problem of using pension points for measuring earnings is that 
earnings below the social security floor are excluded, as are earnings above the 
social security ceiling. For the birth cohort that we selected, it turned out that 
the median earner has about the same income measured by pension points as 
measured by the corresponding variable from tax records in the period  1978- 
94. This means that the number of men with income below the floor (i.e., the 
BA) is so small that it does not affect the measure of median income by pen- 
sion points. But, for individuals at both the tenth and the ninetieth percentiles, 
there is, as expected, a substantial difference between the results from these 
two data  sets. For the simulations for individuals at the tenth and ninetieth 
percentiles, we have imputed incomes for the years where only pension points 
are observed. This is described in appendix C. 
In our data, we found a decline in real earnings in ages fifty-one to fifty-six 
due to the recession experienced by the Swedish economy in the early 1980s. 
We also found a sharp decline in earnings after age sixty for the median earner 
and the earner of  the tenth percentile. A decline could also be seen for the 
ninetieth percentile earner, but one less marked. This is probably explained in 
part by  the fact, which could not be observed in the data, that many people 
decrease the number of hours of work after age sixty. But, in the calculations, 
we assume full-time earnings. To deal with this problem, we make our calcula- 
tions for two cases. In the first, case, we assume that, after age fifty, the indi- 
vidual's  income increases at the same rate  as the change in the real  hourly 
wage rate for the entire Swedish economy, obtained from the national accounts. 
This is treated as the base case in our calculations. These imputed  incomes 
are shown by  a dotted line in figure 9.15. As a sensitivity analysis, we also penaion poinh 
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Fig. 9.15  Base case and diminishing earnings case 
calculate the actual synthetic earnings history for the individual with median 
income in each year until age sixty-four and with the diminishing trend in ages 
sixty-three to sixty-four prolonged to age seventy. As figure 9.15 shows, the 
difference between the two earning profiles is rather small for ages fifty-one to 
sixty-one. After age sixty-one, the difference increases considerably. This is 
partly due to the fact that men born in 1930 reached the age of  sixty-two to 
sixty-four during the recession experienced by  the Swedish economy in the 
early 1990s. 
Section 9.2 above explains that the Swedish social insurance system pro- 
vides benefits for two different pathways of early exiting from the labor mar- 
ket: a disability pension and an old age pension. Figure 9.6 above shows that 
the most frequent means utilized of leaving the labor market is to become an 
old age pensioner. But, as is also evident from figure 9.6, the most common 
way of early exit, that is, exit before the normal retirement age at sixty-five, is 
to start to collect disability insurance payments: about 9 percent of sixty-four- 
year-old men have taken the opportunity for early withdrawal from the old age 
pension, compared to  37  percent who receive benefits from disability in- 
~urance.~~ 
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According to Swedish law, an individual is eligible for a full disability pen- 
sion if  for health reasons he is completely unable to work. If this rule were 
interpreted and applied in a strict sense, and if true working ability were easy 
to observe, there  would be no point in calculating economic incentives for 
continued work for an eligible person since he could not work anyway. How- 
ever, neither of these conditions applies. It is not plausible that 37 percent of 
sixty-four-year-old men are completely unable to  In the United States, 
the corresponding disability rate among sixty-four-year-olds is 8 percent (see 
Diamond and Gruber, chap. 11 in this volume). And, even if the intention of 
the legislation had been that a full disability pension  should not be granted 
unless the individual is completely unable to work, the economic incentives 
would be of interest because the evaluation of working ability is not perfectly 
reliable. For these reasons, we begin the simulations by  considering the case 
of an individual who is judged eligible to receive a full disability pension and 
who considers working full-time one additional year. However, in  the base- 
case calculations, we will also consider the national old age pension. For both 
these base cases, we also include the STP pension  scheme and income tax 
rules and housing allowance. The reason for choosing the STP scheme is that 
this occupational pension scheme covers the largest number of workers. 
To reduce the complexity of the calculations, we applied the 1995 rules for 
all ages between fifty-five and seventy. This implies that we disregard several 
minor changes in benefit rules and the 1990-91  tax reform. The simulations 
show the incentives inherent in the 1995 rules, not those actually confronting 
a man born  in  1930. But, apart from taxes, the structure of the system has 
been constant. 
Applying the rules to the earnings history of the hypothetical individual, 
calculating the monthly payments conditional on the date the hypothetical indi- 
vidual chooses to leave the labor market is fairly straightforward. But the main 
objective of the simulations is to calculate social security wealth (SSW), and 
for this we need additional information. Social security wealth is defined, for 
each point of time, as the net present expected value of future payments from 
the social security system (net of income taxes) less the present expected value 
of future contributions to the system. So we need three additional pieces of 
information: (1) the mortality rates of the hypothetical individual and his wife; 
(2)  the individual's  discount rate; and (3) the contributions to the system that 
the hypothetical individual is expected to pay. The formula for computing so- 
cial security wealth is provided in appendix D. 
In the base-case calculations, we assume that the hypothetical individual is 
married and that his wife is exactly three years younger, that is, born  on  1 
tunity to  obtain a disability pension before the legislative tightening of requirements during the 
1990s. The present legislation is considerably more restrictive  and can be expected to result in 
lower disability rates in the future. 
24. For a short summary of Wadensjo (1996), which analyzes how Swedish disability insurance 
works in practice, see app. B. 382  MHrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
January 1933. We also assume that she never worked. As described in section 
9.2 above, benefit levels differ between a married and a single pensioner. So, 
when calculating the social security wealth for this couple, we must consider 
the probabilities for three different states for each year: (1) both spouses are 
alive; (2) the husband is alive and the wife dead; and (3)  the wife is alive and 
the husband dead. To do this, we used gender-specific life tables (provided by 
Statistics Sweden), which are conditional on the individual living to age fifty- 
five. We assumed independence in mortality rates between the spouses. Note 
that we use the unconditional mortality risk beyond age fifty-five. So there is 
always some mortality risk for all ages older than age fifty-five. Our calcula- 
tions thus give the economic incentives (implied by the social security system) 
that face the representative worker at age fifty-four. But this is not appropriate 
if we are interested in the economic incentives for year-to-year behavior. 
As section 9.2 explains, the Swedish social security system is primarily fi- 
nanced through payroll taxes. In the simulations, we assume that the incidence 
of  these  payroll  taxes  is such that  the  entire  cost  is  directly  passed  on to 
wages.25  The basic pension is partly financed by income taxes. We deduct this 
part of the expenditures and payroll taxes for old age, survivor, and occupa- 
tional pensions in the calculation of net social security wealth. In the disability 
option case, we also deduct payroll taxes for a disability pension. In the base 
case calculations, we assume a discount rate of 3 percent. 
Besides social security wealth, we present three different concepts from the 
simulations: (1) the  replacement  rate, defined as the pension  benefit  net of 
taxes as a share of the earnings net of taxes during the last year of work; (2) 
the accrual  rate, defined as the percentage  change in social security wealth 
compared to the previous year; and (3)  the tax/subsidy  rate, defined as the 
absolute change in social security wealth from an additional year of work di- 
vided by net earnings during the year. If the absolute change in social security 
wealth is zero, the expected present value of the hypothetical individual's con- 
tributions to the system equals the increase in the present value of  the amount 
he expects to receive from the system. Thus, the combined effect of the social 
security system, income taxes, occupational pensions, and housing allowances 
implies neither an implicit tax nor a subsidy on one year's additional work. 
But, if the change in social security wealth is negative, that is, the individual's 
contribution to the social security system of one additional year of work ex- 
ceeds the increase in expected benefits from the social security system, it could 
be interpreted as an implicit tax on one additional year of work induced by the 
systems that we analyze. If the increase in what the individual expects to re- 
ceive from the system from one year of additional work exceeds his contribu- 
tions to the system, it could be interpreted as a subsidy of additional work. By 
relating this amount to the individual's net earnings, it could be interpreted as 
a tax (or subsidy) rate. 
Before continuing, let us take a closer look at the various effects of addi- 
25. Empirical studies (e.g., Palmer and Palme 1989) find that this assumption is highly realistic. 383  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
tional work at the early retirement  ages on  the social security wealth in our 
calculations:  (a)  The share of  the payroll  tax that  constitutes  the  fee to the 
pension system will decrease the worker’s social security wealth if he contin- 
ues to work. This is not the case after age sixty-five because employers need 
not pay payroll taxes for these workers. (6)  There is some risk that the worker 
will die for each year he decides to continue to work. This will lower his social 
security wealth. (c)  If the worker decides to continue to work beyond age sixty, 
his monthly pension payments from the public pension scheme will increase 
by  0.5 percent  for each  month that  he continues to  work  beyond  age sixty 
until age sixty-five and by 0.7 percent beyond age sixty-five until his seventieth 
birthday. This actuarial adjustment will increase the individual’s social security 
wealth. Note that the adjustment of the pension benefit does not  occur if the 
individual receives disability insurance. (d)  An additional year of work means 
fewer years when pension benefits can be claimed, which decreases social se- 
curity wealth. However, as it is not possible to claim benefits before age sixty 
in the old age pension scheme, this applies only in the disability insurance case 
before age sixty. (e) Because the net income streams constitute social security 
wealth, income taxes on pension incomes will decrease social security wealth. 
The housing allowance will also affect net income. If an individual decides to 
work one additional year, he may increase his annual pension income. But this 
might reduce his housing allowance, net income, and thereby his social secu- 
rity wealth.’h (f)  The ATP and STP  benefits are related to the worker’s previous 
earnings. The requirement  for receipt of a full ATP benefit is thirty years of 
earnings and for receipt of a full STP pension twenty-eight years of earnings 
starting  from  1965.”  Furthermore,  the  STP scheme requires  three  years  of 
earnings between the ages of  fifty-five and sixty-four if the individual is to be 
eligible for any benefit at all. Apart from these requirements, the ATP pension 
is determined  by  the average of  the individual’s best  fifteen years, the  STP 
pension by the best three years between the ages of fifty-five and fifty-nine. So 
the levels of the pensions from both schemes could be affected depending on 
when the individual decides to leave the labor force. 
Besides the base-case simulations, we perform simulations where we alter 
the assumptions  of the second base case. In this context, we investigate the 
results assuming that our representative individual follows the earnings path of 
the tenth and ninetieth percentile earners for each year-rather  than the me- 
dian. We also use an earnings path for the median earner with decreasing earn- 
ings toward the end of the career. We  alter the composition of the household 
of  the hypothetical individual, that is, assume a single hypothetical individual. 
Finally, we investigate what happens if the hypothetical individual has an in- 
complete earnings history starting at age thirty-five. 
For the simulations with these alternative assumptions, we use the rules for 
26. Section 9:2  above provides a short description of  the Swedish income tax system and the 
27. This rule applies to individuals born in 1930. For those born in  1932 and later, the require- 
housing allowance scheme. 
ment was thirty years. 384  MBrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
Table 9.2  Incentive Calculations-Base  Case with Disability Pension Option 
Last Age  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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the old age pension rather than the disability pension. The reason for choosing 
the old age pension  scheme for the sensitivity analyses is that the actuarial 
adjustment in this scheme generally provides us with a richer set of results 
because it interacts with the income tax system and the housing allowances. 
9.3.2  Base-Case Results 
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 show the base case results. Table 9.2 shows the results 
for a worker who is eligible for a disability pension, table 9.3 the results for 
one who is not. Each row in these tables gives the various results provided that 
the representative individual works until the age depicted in the first column, 
that is, provided that he retires on his next birthday. The second column gives 
the replacement rate. As it is not possible to start to receive payments from the 
national old age pension scheme before age sixty, the first five numbers in table 
9.3 are left out in the second column. 
Comparing column 3 in tables 9.2 and 9.3, we see that there is a large differ- 
ence in social security wealth depending on whether disability is an available 
option: the value of  the individual’s social security wealth on his fifty-fifth 
birthday is SKr 2,020,280 (U.S.$283,349)  with disability pension  and SKr 
1,168,183 (U.S.$163,841) without. This 73 percent difference in social secu- 
rity wealth represents the present value of the gain the representative worker 
can obtain if he decides to retire at age fifty-five and is eligible for disability 
insurance.**  By comparing column 4 in tables 9.2 and 9.3, it can also be seen 
28. These figures include only the present expected value of future benefits; contributions up to 
this age are not deducted. But the following rows account for changes in benefits and contributions. 
In order to obtain the figure of a 73 percent difference, we  have used the same conditional 385  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
Table 9.3  Base-Case Incentive Calculations 
Last Age  Replacement  Accrual  Tax I 
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that the change in social security wealth is equal in the two base cases if the 
representative  worker decides to work his last year at age sixty-four or later. 
This is because the worker is not eligible for disability insurance after age 
sixty-five and the base cases are therefore equivalent beyond this age. 
By studying the column giving taxlsubsidy rates in tables 9.2 and 9.3, sev- 
eral interesting properties of the two schemes can be noted. First, both systems 
provide a tax rather than a subsidy of  additional work throughout the entire 
period considered. Second, the level of  the tax rate is much higher over the 
entire period for the case where we treat  disability insurance as an old age 
pension option. This result is not surprising since, unlike the old age pension 
scheme, disability insurance has no actuarial adjustment of the benefit if  the 
individual begins to claim benefits early. This explains the difference in the tax 
rate between age sixty and age sixty-five. Furthermore, if an individual retires 
without a disability pension before age sixty, he cannot start to claim benefits 
until age sixty anyway; that is, if the individual decides to work one additional 
year before age sixty, the number of pension payments he receives will not be 
affected, and the tax on additional work will be smaller than  it would have 
been were this not the case. This is not true for disability insurance at any age. 
For each additional year the worker decides to work, he will have to give up 
disability insurance payments. 
survival probabilities as we did for the old age pension case. This represents a case where the 
individual manages to get disability insurance without any severe physical handicap. We  have, 
however, also made calculations where we use an estimate of the survival probabilities for the 
population of those who receive disability insurance. In this case, social security wealth is SKr 
1,908,873  (U.S.$267,724) if the worker retires at age fifty-five, i.e., 5.5 percent lower. 386  MIrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
Table 9.4  Tax/Subsidy Rate: Base Case with Disability Pension Option 
Net Public 
Gross Public  Net Public  Pension + 
Last Age  Gross Public  Pension +  Pension +  STP + 
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. I93 
For the disability pension case, the tax rate on one year of additional work 
at age fifty-five is above  100 percent.  This means that  the accrual in social 
security wealth is larger, in absolute value, than the net income of the represen- 
tative worker. The tax rate on additional work remains in general very high, 
above 70 percent, until the representative worker reaches age sixty-five. 
To facilitate the analysis of which parts of the institutional system generate 
the variations in the taxkubsidy rates and of the results in general, we present 
for the sake of comparison tables 9.4 and 9.5. Column 4 in these tables gives 
the taxhbsidy rate where we have not considered the housing allowance. Col- 
umn 3 shows the taxhbsidy rate where we have considered neither the hous- 
ing allowance nor income tax. Column 2 gives the taxhubsidy rate, but without 
considering the STP pension scheme. The last column gives the total effect of 
all parts of the system. The results of the four columns are also shown in figures 
9.16 and 9.17. 
The tax on additional work decreases somewhat for one year of additional 
work after the fifty-seventh birthday for both base cases. Itemfabove explains 
this. The STP scheme requires at least three years of  work between age fifty- 
five and age sixty-four; that is, one additional year of work at age fifty-seven 
leads to a lifetime increase in monthly pension payments of  about 10 percent. 
This can be more carefully examined in tables 9.4 and 9.5 as well as in figures 
9.16 and 9.17. Comparing the results obtained when we took the STP benefit 
into account with those obtained  when we did not, we can see that the STP 
benefit creates a dramatic shift in the graph of the taxhbsidy  rate. The graphs 
in figures 9.16 and 9.17 also show that the incentive to stay in the labor force 387  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
Table 9.5  TaxlSubsidy Rate: Base Case 
Net Public 
Gross Public  Net Public  Pension + 
Last Age  Gross Public  Pension +  Pension +  STP + 
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Fig. 9.16  Taxhbsidy rate, base case with disability pension option 
created by STP is to a large extent counteracted by income taxes and the hous- 
ing allowance: for the disability pension case, the tax rate increases from 16.9 
percent when we do not consider income taxes and housing allowances to 27.5 
percent when we do. 
Turning to the case without a disability pension, we can see that the accrual 
and taxlsubsidy  rates vary between three phases:  between age fifty-four and 
age fifty-nine, when there is a relatively low tax on continued work; between 388  MHrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
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Fig. 9.17  Taxhubsidy rate, base case 
age sixty and age sixty-four, when there is a relatively high tax rate; and be- 
tween age sixty-five and age sixty-nine, when there is a somewhat lower tax 
rate compared to the preceding phase, but a rate that increases within the phase. 
The pattern of these three phases can be explained by the six institutional fac- 
tors that determine social security wealth, which the previous section summa- 
rized. The fact that the number of  monthly pension payments will not be af- 
fected by whether the individual chooses to work one extra year between age 
fifty-five and age fifty-nine because neither the national nor the STP pension 
can be collected before age sixty (item d above) explains why there is a differ- 
ence between the taxhbsidy rate in this age group compared to the age group 
sixty to sixty-four. The difference in the taxhubsidy rate between age sixty to 
sixty-four and age sixty-five to sixty-nine is attributed to the fact that employ- 
ers need not pay payroll taxes for employees beyond age sixty-five. 
Figure 9.17 also gives some background as to why the old age and survivor 
pension  systems  provide  a  tax  rather  than  a  subsidy  on  additional  work 
throughout the rest of the age interval considered. Following the graph, where 
we consider only the old age national pension schemes, we can see that the 
system is about actuarially fair until age sixty. After that, the taxhbsidy rate 
turns positive, that is, turns to a tax on additional work, and increases. This 
result shows that the 0.5 percent reduction in the monthly pension payments 
for each month of early withdrawal before age sixty-five for the basic pension 
and the ATP and the 0.7 percent increase in the payments from these pension 
schemes for each  month  of  delayed withdrawal  after age sixty-five are not 
enough to offset the pension payments given up and the contributions paid by 
working additional years. This result depends on the choice of discount rate. 389  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
Choosing a discount rate greater than 3 percent makes the decrease in social 
security wealth even greater, while choosing a smaller discount rate makes 
this decrease smaller. Also note that these results are, at least to some extent, 
dependent on the option of using unconditional mortality risk beyond age fifty- 
five. A lower mortality risk gives a higher value to future pension payments 
and therefore a smaller increase in the implicit tax rate. 
Figure 9.17 also shows the importance of income taxes and housing allow- 
ances. By comparing the graph where we consider income taxes and housing 
allowances with the graph where we have not, we can see that income taxes 
and rules for the housing allowance lead to a large part of the taxes on addi- 
tional work under age sixty-four. 
9.3.3  Other Cases 
Table 9.6 gives the same information as table 9.3 above for a worker who, 
instead of  following the earnings of  the median earner, follows those of the 
tenth percentile during his work life. We  follow the same principles for the 
imputation of earnings beyond age fifty as we did in the base-case calculations. 
Table 9.7 and figure 9.18 give the corresponding information as table 9.5 and 
figure 9.17 above for this earnings history. A comparison of tables 9.3 and 9.5 
above and tables 9.6 and 9.7 show that the implicit tax rate largely follows the 
same pattern as for the base-case calculations. The main difference is that the 
implicit tax rate on additional work is higher in this case (being above 50 per- 
cent for those who decide to work one additional year at age sixty-one). The 
high tax rate also continues for ages sixty-five and sixty-six. By studying the 
difference between the graphs for the taxlsubsidy rate where we have and have 
Table 9.6  Incentive Calculations: Tenth Percentile 
Last Age  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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Table 9.7  Tax/Subsidy Rate: Tenth Percentile 
Net Public 
GrossYdtilic  'NetYlitilic  Tension + 
Last Age  Gross Public  Pension +  Pension +  STP + 
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Fig. 9.18  Taxkubsidy rate, tenth percentile 
not considered income taxes and housing allowances, we can conclude that 
this higher tax-compared  to the base case-can  be explained by the high 
marginal effects of housing allowances and income taxes. 
Table 9.8 and 9.9 and figure 9.19 explore the results for a worker following 
the earnings of the ninetieth percentile. Although the pattern of the changes in 
the accrual rate over the period considered is similar to that of the base case, 391  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
Table 9.8  Incentive Calculations: Ninetieth Percentile 
Last Age  Replacement  Accrual  Tax I 
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Table 9.9  Tax/Subsidy Rate: Ninetieth Percentile 
Net Public 
Gross Public  Net Public  Pension + 
Last Age  Gross Public  Pension +  Pension +  STP + 













































































there are two interesting differences, First, the spike at age fifty-seven remains 
when we  also consider income taxes and housing allowances. A comparison 
of figures 9.17 above and 9.19 shows that this difference is primarily due to the 
fact that the representative individual in this case is not eligible for a housing 
allowance. Second, the implicit tax on additional work is much higher for all 392  MBrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
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Fig. 9.19  Taxhbsidy rate, ninetieth percentile 
Table 9.10  Incentive Calculations: Single Worker 
Last Age  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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ages beyond age sixty-two-compared  to the base case. For ages sixty-six to 
sixty-eight, the difference is explained by the fact that the representative nineti- 
eth percentile individual has a higher marginal tax rate compared to the base 
case. For  ages sixty to sixty-one, the median individual has a higher tax on 
additional work due to the reduction of the housing allowance. 
Tables 9.10 and 9.11 and figure 9.20 give the results where we assume that 
the representative worker is single. We can see that, here, the implicit tax rate 393  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
Table 9.11  TaxlSubsidy Rate: Single Worker 
Net Public 
Gross Public  Net Public  Pension + 
Last Age  Gross Public  Pension +  Pension +  STP + 
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Fig. 9.20  Taxlsubsidy rate, single worker 
is generally higher, especially if the individual chooses to work one additional 
year between age fifty-seven and age sixty. This difference is due to the fact 
that one year of  additional work  at this age gives a higher survivor pension 
from both the ATP and the STP schemes. But additional work after age sixty 
will have no effect on the STP survivor pension and have very little effect on 
the ATP pension; this is why the difference between  this case and the base 394  MIrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
Table 9.12  Incentive Calculations: Diminishing-Earnings  Profile 
Last Age  Replacement  Accrual  Tax1 
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case diminishes with age. Had we selected a larger age difference between the 
representative  worker and his wife in the base-case calculations, that is, had 
the wife belonged to a younger birth cohort, the difference in the accrual rate 
between the  case with  a single worker  and the base case would have been 
smaller because the transition  rules for the survivor pension would have re- 
duced the survivor pension within the ATP. 
In tables 9.12 and 9.13 and figure 9.21, we evaluate the sensitivity to the 
imputation of incomes after age fifty in the synthetic earnings history in our 
base-case simulations by  using the median earnings history after age fifty as 
well, that is, the actual synthetic earnings history. A comparison of  the tax/ 
subsidy rate for this case with that for the base case reveals two effects that 
work in different directions. Lower earnings between  age fifty-five and age 
fifty-nine means (as pointed out in itemfabove) lower ATP and, more impor- 
tant for this particular phase in the work life, lower STP. But the contribution 
through the payroll tax is lower. The tables show that the implicit tax rate is 
somewhat lower when we use the actual synthetic earnings history compared 
to the base case, although the difference is very  small. This means that the 
second effect dominates with a small margin. 
Tables 9.14 and 9.15 and figure 9.22 show what happens if we decrease the 
number of years in the labor force of the representative  individual. We  now 
assume that he starts to work at age thirty-five, that is, meets the requirement 
for a full ATP pension of thirty years of contributions to this pension scheme 
at age sixty-four compared to the base case, where the worker meets the re- 
quirement at age fifty-nine. Thus, the only phase where we expect the incen- 395  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
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Table 9.13  Tax/Subsidy Rate: Diminishing-Earnings Profile 
Net Public 
Gross Public  Net Public  Pension + 
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Fig. 9.21  Taxhbsidy rate, diminishing-earnings  profile 
9 
tives of the social security system to differ between this case and the base case 
is between age sixty and age sixty-four, This is also exactly what we see if we 
compare tables 9.3 and 9.5 above and tables 9.14 and 9.15. The implicit tax 
rate on additional years of work is substantially higher between age sixty and 
age sixty-four. For the rest of the period, it is more or less the same. 396  MHrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
Table 9.14  Incentive Calculations: Incomplete Earnings History 
Last Age  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 





























































-  .027 
~  .028 
-.017 
-  ,026 
-.027 
-  .038 
-  ,044 
-  .044 
-  .022 
-.028 







.  I25 












Table 9.15  Tax/Subsidy Rate: Incomplete Earnings History 
Net Public 
Gross Public  Net Public  Pension + 
Last Age  Gross Public  Pension +  Pension +  STP + 
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9.4  Conclusions 
The simulations of how social security wealth is affected when a representa- 
tive worker decides to retire carried out in section 9.3 above reveal huge differ- 
ences in the economic incentives for leaving the labor force provided by  dis- 397  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
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Fig. 9.22  Taxhbsidy rate, incomplete earnings history 
ability insurance and the old age pension: the implicit tax on additional work 
generated by  disability insurance is above 100 percent of the representative 
worker's net income. Still, the overview of the rates of labor force participation 
in section 9.1 shows that, despite these economic incentives, labor force partic- 
ipation is very high until about age fifty-eight and the hazard rate out of the 
labor force is moderate before this age. This observation supports the findings 
obtained in previous research (see Hedstrom  1987; and Wadensjo 1996) that 
the rate of people receiving disability insurance is determined by access to this 
insurance, that is, by the strictness in the law determining eligibility and the 
application of this law in the social insurance administration, rather than by 
individual economic incentives. Further research using micro data is, however, 
required to resolve this issue. 
On the other hand, the economic incentives generated by the old age pension 
scheme seem to have an effect on retirement behavior. A striking observation 
that can be made from section 9.1 above is that labor force participation in the 
age group fifty-five to fifty-nine is very high compared to that in the age groups 
sixty to sixty-four and sixty-five and over. The historical trends in labor force 
participation for men also suggest that the decrease in labor force participation 
in this age group is smaller than that in the age group sixty to sixty-four. It is 
unlikely that this difference between these age groups can be explained en- 
tirely by biology. In this context, it is interesting to note that the simulations 
presented in section 9.3 above indicate that the pension system, especially the 
occupational pension scheme for blue-collar workers, provides stronger eco- 
nomic incentives not to leave the labor force up to age fifty-seven than after 
this age. The explanations for the very low labor force participation of persons 
aged sixty-five and older are dominated by the rules for mandatory retirement 
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Another interesting observation that can be made on the basis of the simula- 
tions presented in section 9.3 is the importance of income taxes and housing 
allowances. When we consider only the rules for the national pension system 
in the simulations, the system is close to being actuarially fair regarding when 
the individual decides to exit from the labor market and start to claim benefits. 
But, when we also consider the effect of income taxes and housing allowances, 
there is an implicit tax on continued work. The economic incentives provided 
by the STP occupational pension scheme are also largely counteracted. The 
political objective of the highly progressive income taxes, in particular for old 
age pensioners, and housing allowances is to provide an equal income distribu- 
tion among old age pensioners. Obviously, this objective of equity in the distri- 
bution of economic outcome conflicts with the objective of equity inherent in 
the actuarial fairness of the pension system. 
Appendix A 
Data Sources 
The statistical source of the figures about labor force participation is the Swed- 
ish Labor Force Survey. This survey has been conducted since 196  1,  and com- 
parable figures are available since 1963. From 1963 until 1969, the survey was 
conducted four times every year, and the sample  size was twelve  thousand 
individuals (i.e., forty-eight thousand each year). Since 1970, the sample size 
is about twenty thousand, and the survey is conducted every month. We used 
annual averages in the figures, except for the age group sixty-five to seventy- 
four between  1986 and 1995, for which we used the average for the last three 
months of every year because this age group is only included in the population 
of these surveys. The rate of nonresponse is about 10 percent in each survey. 
Four different measures of attachment to the labor market are reported in the 
figures: labor force participation, employed, full-time employed, and working. 
Individuals who did some kind of paid work for at least one hour in the week 
of the survey are defined as employed. Those actively searching for a job or 
expecting  to start a job within  four weeks are defined  as unemployed. The 
employed and unemployed constitute the labor force. Students and participants 
in labor market programs are not considered as members of  the labor force. 
Individuals who regularly work thirty-five hours per week are defined as  full- 
time employed. Employed persons who were not absent all days in the week 
preceding the time of the survey are defined as working. 
Statistics Sweden provided the Household Income Survey  1994. The data 
from this survey consist of three parts; information from (1) interviews about, 
for example, employment, housing, and household composition, (2)  tax returns 399  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
from household members on different components of household income, and 
(3)  administrative records on taxes and transfers from the government. The rate 
of nonresponse is about 11 percent. The sample size of this survey is about ten 
thousand  households.  The total  number  of  observations  in  single-year  age 
groups varies between about 100 and 250. This means that some of the esti- 
mates in figures 9.11-9.13  above are based on very few observations. 
Appendix B 
Review of Previous Empirical Studies on 
Social Security and Retirement 
The effect of  the Swedish social security system on labor force participation 
was  analyzed  in  a  few  empirical  studies.  The most  general  is  Hansson- 
Brusewitz (1992), which estimates a life-cycle and an atemporal labor supply 
model  on cross-sectional  data for men  aged between  fifty-five and  seventy. 
Modeling the dichotomous choice of  labor force participation jointly with the 
choice with hours of labor supply enables Hansson-Brusewitz to study the ef- 
fect of the introduction of the partial pension scheme on desired retirement age 
and desired number of hours of work for those who are not retired. Using the 
life-cycle model, he finds that this scheme actually has a positive effect on 
total hours of work. He also simulates the effect of other, hypothetical reforms 
in the Swedish income tax and social security systems. Again using the life- 
cycle model,  he finds that  a  10 percentage  point  decrease in the marginal 
income tax rates will increase the labor supply of elderly men  by  about 2.5 
percentage  points. A simulation of  the effects of replacing current rules for 
calculating the benefits in the ATP scheme with a pension benefit that is equal 
to 60 percent of lifetime earnings shows a small positive effect on desired labor 
supply for those who have not retired, although a small negative effect on the 
desired retirement age. 
Sundtn ( 1994) estimates a conditional/multinomial  logit model and consid- 
ers the individual choice among four different options: (1) fully retire at age 
sixty; (2)  retire with disability insurance at age sixty; (3) partially retire at age 
sixty; and (4) do not retire at all before age sixty-five. SundCn estimates this 
model using cross-sectional data for 1974 and  1981, that is, before and after 
the introduction of the partial retirement  scheme in  1976. She finds that the 
introduction of the partial pension resulted in a small decrease in the number 
of individuals receiving benefits from disability insurance.  By decomposing 
the overall change in retirement behavior between  1974 and 1981 in changes 
attributed to estimated coefficients (preferences) and individual characteristics 
(among these, changes in  individual pension wealth), she concludes that the 400  MHrten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
largest share of the change in retirement behavior seen between 1974 and 198  1 
can be attributed to changes in preferences. Changes in rules, reflected in the 
variables of individual characteristics, have a very small effect. 
By studying the rules governing the receipt of benefits from disability insur- 
ance and the social security system for different pathways to early retirement, 
Kruse and Soderstrom (1989) find that, primarily, disability insurance and the 
partial retirement scheme provide large subsidies for early retirement and part- 
time work among the elderly. They suggest that the decreased labor supply 
among the elderly and the increased dependency ratio in the social security 
system to a large extent can be attributed to these generous benefits. 
Wadensjo  (1996) takes a closer look at how the legislation for disability 
insurance works in practice. Wadensjo shows that fluctuations in the number 
of new disability pensions between  1972 and  1991 can largely be explained 
by variations  in the unemployment level (with a lag of  about two years). He 
describes a common pathway to early retirement from the Swedish labor mar- 
ket. A company wants to reduce its personnel. In  general, the older workers 
are best protected by seniority rules in Swedish legislation. But the company 
wants to retain at least some of its young workers. A standard procedure is then 
to investigate whether any of the older workers are eligible to receive a disabil- 
ity pension.  The necessary  medical examination  is often  conducted  by  the 
company doctor. Including extra severance payments, the compensation level 
for the dismissed older workers, who are eligible for disability pension, could 
be more than 100 percent of forgone earnings. The local unions are then often 
willing to deviate from the seniority rule. The implementation of new, stricter 
rules governing eligibility for a disability pension has made it more difficult 
for firms to use this option for reducing personnel. But a market for insurance 
(guarantee pensions), offered by private insurance companies, that retains the 
same early labor market exit option for older workers has been introduced. 
Eriksen and Palmer (1997) examine the concept of  disability as it is em- 
ployed in Sweden and find that the increasing rate of disability since 1960 is 
largely a result of changes in factors other than health, concluding that labor 
market factors are predominantly responsible for the trend. 
Appendix C 
Imputations of  Income 
For the tenth percentile income earners, we had to impute incomes for ages 
thirty to forty-seven. For ages forty-eight to fifty-nine, the observed difference 
between true income and income measured by pension points is about 10 per- 
cent on average. We assumed that the corresponding difference decreases from 401  Social Security, Occupational Pensions, and Retirement in Sweden 
20 percent at age thirty to 10 percent at age forty-seven, which reflects a larger 
share of  earners with income below the BA at lower ages. For the ninetieth 
percentile  income  earner,  we  can  observe true  income  only  in ages under 
thirty-six  and above forty-seven because income is above the social security 
ceiling between  these ages. We  assumed that income increases linearly  be- 
tween age thirty-five and age forty-eight. 
Appendix D 
The Formula for Computing Social 
Security Wealth (SSW) 
a0  = the worker’s age at evaluation of social security wealth (set to fifty-five in 
the base-case calculations); 
r  = the worker’s age at retirement; 
maxage  = maximum potential age; 
p(ala,)  = probability of  survival of the worker at age a conditional on survival at 
q(ala,)  = probability of  survival of the spouse at the worker’s age a conditional on 
BM(a, r) = amount of the worker’s pension benefit at age a if he retires at age rand 
BS(a, r)  = amount of the worker’s pension benefit at age a if he retires at age rand 
S(a, r)  = amount of survivor benefit the year when the worker would have been of 
C(a)  = amount of the worker’s contribution to social security at age a; and 
P  = discount rate (set to 3 percent in the base-case calculations). 
age a,; 
survival of the spouse at the worker’s age a,. 
is married at age a; 
is not married at age a; 
age a if he retires at age r; 
SSC(a,, r) = 
SSW(a,,,  r) = 402  Mhten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
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